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RESPONSE TO STATEMENT OF
CROSS-APPEAL ISSUE PRESENTED FOR APPEAL
The appellees and Cross-Appellants, Wasatch Management ("Wasatch") and
Kenneth C. Jensen, Earlene B. Jensen, Steven E. Jensen and Kevin J. Jensen (collectively the
"Jensens"), contend their cross-appeal of the trial court's order refusing to award attorney's
fees should be reviewed for "patent error or clear abuse of discretion." (Aplee. Br. at 1.)
The proper standard of review, however, is correction of error, with no deference accorded
to the trial court's determination. Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305, 315 (Utah 1998)
("Whether attorney fees are recoverable in an action is a question of law, which we review
for correctness.")
The standard of review invoked by Wasatch and the Jensens concerns a trial court's
determination of what constitutes a reasonable fee. The trial court did not reach that issue
because, it determined, Wasatch and the Jensens had no statutory or contractual right to an
award of attorney's fees. (R. 892, 893.)

REPLY TO APPELLEES5 STATEMENT OF FACTS
Wasatch and the Jensens have offered a "Statement of Facts" that appears to be a
verbatim reproduction (including the use of plaintiff and defendants to refer to the parties)
of the "Findings of Fact" they prepared in connection with the trial court's order of summary
judgment in their favor. Many of those "facts," however, are actually conclusions of law.
Paragraphs 5 through 9 of Wasatch and the Jensens' "Statement of Facts" constitute
legal conclusions concerning the Combined Agreement's treatment of the interests of Orlob
and Professionals Control Group ("PCG"). There is nothing factual about the conclusions
in paragraphs 5 through 9 that the Combined Agreement treats Orlob and PCG "collectively."
Because the trial court ruled on summary judgment and without consideration of any
extrinsic evidence, that is a legal issue before this Court on appeal.
1

The "Statement of Facts" is also more broadly flawed because Wasatch and the
Jensens have not cited to the record in support of any of the proffered facts. Indeed, nowhere
in their response brief have Wasatch and the Jensens made reference to the record.
Citations to the record are required under Rule 24(e) of the Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure. Koulis v. Standard Oil Co. of Calif., 746 P.2d 1182, 1184 (Utah App. 1987)
(applying Rule 24(a) of the Rules of Utah Court of Appeals). The Court of Appeals "'need
not, and will not, consider any facts not properly cited to, or supported by, the record.'" Id.
(quoting Uckerman v. Lincoln Natl Life Ins. Co., 588 P.2d 142, 144 (Utah 1978)).
Moreover, Rule 24(a)(5)(A) specifically requires each appellant to make "citation to the
record showing the issue was preserved in the trial court;..."
Wasatch and the Jensens have not satisfied their obligations under Rule 24. As such,
they have offered no facts in opposition to Orlob's motion for partial summary judgment, no
facts in support of their motion for summary judgment on Orlob's claims, and no facts in
support of their cross-appeal.
STATEMENT OF FACTS REGARDING CROSS-APPEAL
The "Statement of Facts," as noted above, appears to be a reproduction of the trial
court's "Findings of Fact" in connection with the entry of summary judgment in favor of
Wasatch and the Jensens. No other facts are proffered. Because the cross-appeal concerns
only attorney's fees, and that issue was addressed in a separate order, the trial court's
"Findings of Fact" are entirely inapposite to this cross-appeal. Thus, Wasatch and the
Jensens' "Statement of Facts" contains no facts of any kind, including any reference to the
language of the Combined Agreement, in support of their cross-appeal on the trial court's
refusal to award attorney's fees.

2

Orlob submits the following facts in response to Wasatch and the Jensens' crossappeal:
1.

Paragraph 21 of the Combined Agreement provides as follows:
Parties further acknowledge that in the event of a default the
non-defaulting party shall be entitled to all costs, including
reasonable attorney fees, to enforce the terms and conditions of
this Agreement against the defaulting party. Each party further
acknowledges that this Agreement represents all of the terms
and conditions, understanding and duties of the parties and that
there are no other agreements not contained within this
Agreement. [R. 049, 056; emphasis added.]

2.

Orlob filed a memorandum in opposition to Wasatch and the Jensens' motion

for attorney's fees. (R. 825-62.)
4.

Wasatch and the Jensens did not file a reply memorandum in support of their

motion for attorney's fees.
5.

The trial court denied Wasatch and the Jensens' motion for attorney's fees due

to the lack of statutory or contractual right to the same. (R. 892, 893.)
ARGUMENT
I.

The Trial Court's Denial of Orlob's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment
Should be Reversed.
A.

Orlob's Statement of Facts Supporting Summary Judgment is
Undisputed.

In their response brief, Wasatch and the Jensens have chosen to focus their discussion
almost exclusively on whether they are entitled to summary judgment. (See Aplee. Br. at 712.) They have devoted only two-thirds of one page of their discussion to Orlob's appeal
seeking reversal of the denial of Orlob's motion for partial summary judgment on liability
(breach of contract). (See Aplee. Br. at 12.)
With respect to Orlob's appeal from the denial of his motion for partial summary
judgment, Wasatch and the Jensens do not even discuss specific facts in an attempt to raise
3

a genuine issue of material fact. Rather, they assert, incorrectly, that Orlob must "marshal
evidence" in support of the trial court's ruling. {Id.) They further assert, also incorrectly,
that the "District Court's factual findings will not be disturbed unless it can be shown that
those findings are clearly erroneous. (Id., citing Desert Miriah, Inc. v. B&LAuto, Inc., 2000
UT83,1|9, 12P.3d580, 582.)
There has been no trial on the merits, and therefore Orlob has no duty to marshal the
evidence. See Crisman v. Hallows, 2000 UT App 104, If 8 n. 3, 999 P.2d 1249, 1251
("Because on motion for summary judgment the court does not make findings of fact, but
rather determines only whether the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law based
upon the undisputed material facts, we reject defendant's argument that plaintiffs were
required to marshal the evidence to attack what the court labeled as findings of fact.")
This appeal arises from the trial court's denial of Orlob's motion for partial summary
judgment and entry of summary judgment in favor of Wasatch and the Jensens. Under such
circumstances, a trial court's "findings of fact" are "clearly inappropriate." Buzas Baseball,
Inc. v. Salt Lake Trappers, Inc., 925 P.2d 941, 946 (Utah 1996). "By definition, summary
judgment cannot be granted where there are disputed facts." Id. See also, Dubois v. Grand
Central, 872 P.2d 1073, 1076 (Utah App. 1994) (stating "a court should not make findings
of fact in a summary judgment other than a restatement of the undisputed facts stated in favor
of the nonmoving party."). Consequently, the trial court should not have entered "findings
of fact" since it ruled as a matter of law. Those "findings of fact" are not, as Wasatch and
the Jensens contend, subject to a clearly erroneous standard of review; rather, because the
entry of summary judgment is reviewed for correctness, the trial court's ruling is accorded
no deference. See Crisman, 999 P.2d at 1250.
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Thus, to at least attempt to avoid reversal of the trial court's ruling denying partial
summary judgment, it was incumbent upon Wasatch and the Jensens to point to record
evidence capable of raising a genuine issue of material fact, or otherwise to explain why
Orlob was not entitled to judgment as a matter of law. However, Point II of their response
brief, in which Orlob's motion for partial summary judgment is addressed, does not point to
controverting evidence of any kind. Accordingly, the facts set forth in Orlob's statement of
facts are undisputed. Those undisputed facts (all of which were undisputed in the trial court
as well) can be summarized as follows:
•

A true and correct copy of the Combined Agreement is attached as Exhibit A
to Orlob's opening brief (See also, R. 049-59.)

•

All of PCG's assets were transferred to Wasatch and the Jensens pursuant to
the Combined Agreement. (Aplee. Br. at 4, f 5.)

•

PCG transferred ownership of its equipment and physician contracts. (Id., f 4.)

•

PCG ceased operations after the Combined Agreement was signed on or about
August 1,1988, and was dissolved as a Utah corporation in or about February
1990. (Id at 5,110.)

•

Wasatch and the Jensens made all payments under the Combined Agreement
by checks payable to Orlob personally. (Aplt. Br. at 7,]f 6.)

•

Wasatch and the Jensens continued to make payments under the Combined
Agreement by checks payable to Orlob personally after PCG was dissolved.
(Id)

•

Wasatch and the Jensens purchased PCG's interest in the Combined
Agreement at an IRS auction on December 10, 1990. (Id. at 6, f 14.)
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•

Wasatch and the Jensens ceased making payments under the Combined
Agreement after the IRS auction. (R. 432.)

B.

Orlob is Entitled to Judgment as a Matter of Law.

In his opening brief, Orlob set forth the legal standards governing this appellate
review of the trial court's interpretation of the Combined Agreement as a matter of law.
(Aplt. Br. at 11-12.) Wasatch and the Jensens have not objected to that recitation of the law.
In his opening brief, Orlob also examined the contract language. (Aplt. Br. at 12-17.)
No part of that discussion will be repeated here because, in their response brief, Wasatch and
the Jensens do not challenge, and thereby effectively concede, the argument made by Orlob.
Orlob herein refers to Point I.B.I, of his opening brief, wherein the analysis of the contract
language is set forth fully.

Since the payments for the non-competition were made

exclusively to Orlob, individually, there can be no dispute that Orlob, individually, held a
contractual right to receive all such payments. The trial court placed exclusive reliance on
the introductory paragraph of the Combined Agreement.1 (R. 779-80; R. 913, at 33-34.)
The trial court erred when it disregarded other language within the four corners of the
contract that clarifies the ambiguity created by the introductory paragraph. Harmonizing all
of the contract language, including the signature page, the parties intended to include Orlob
as an individual party to the Combined Agreement's terms. Thus, the introductory paragraph
should be construed to mean the Orlob "Group" consists of PCG and/or Orlob. References
1

Wasatch and the Jensens assert the trial court relied on other provisions of the
contract as well. (Aplee. Br. at 7-8.) However, they do not support their bare assertion
by pointing to any instance where the trial court even mentioned other language. In fact,
at the oral argument on the cross-motions for summary judgment, the trial court referred
only to the introductory paragraph. (R. 113, at 33-34.) Its findings of fact also refer only
to the introductory paragraph (R. 779-82.) Therefore, in ruling as a matter of law without
resort to extrinsic evidence, it must be presumed the trial court placed exclusive reliance
on the introductory paragraph of the Combined Agreement. That failure to harmonize all
provisions explains in part the court's erroneous conclusion.
6

in the body of the contract to "Orlob" must include, or mean only, Orlob in his individual
capacity, and references to "Professional's Control Group" must mean PCG alone.
In the event this Court concludes the Combined Agreement is ambiguous in its
treatment of Orlob as an individual party, Orlob is still entitled to judgment as a matter of
law. The extrinsic evidence, as set forth in Point LA, above, is undisputed and establishes
the intent of the parties to include Orlob as an individual party with rights to payments for
his covenant not to compete. See EIE v. St. Benedict's Hosp., 638 P.2d 1190, 1195 (Utah
1981) (holding that defendant's course of conduct of reimbursing plaintiff 90% of each bill
rather than flat $90 fee was best indication of parties' intention).
Wasatch and the Jensens do not dispute they terminated all payments under the
Combined Agreement when they purchased PCG's interest at the IRS auction on December
10, 1990. (R. 432.) Accordingly, the trial court erred when it refused to enter partial
summary judgment in favor of Orlob. As a matter of law, Wasatch and the Jensens breached
their obligations to make payments to Orlob under the Combined Agreement for the
commission period December 10, 1990 through July 31, 1994.
The trial court's denial of Orlob's motion for partial summary judgment should be
reversed, partial summary judgment on liability should be entered, and the case should be
remanded for a trial on damages awardable to Orlob.
11.

The Trial Court Erred When It Entered Summary Judgment in Favor of
Wasatch and the Jensens on Orlob's Claims.
A.

Wasatch and the Jensens are Not Entitled to Judgment as a Matter of
Law.

As an initial matter, since partial summary judgment should be granted in favor of
Orlob, as set forth in Point I, above, the summary judgment in favor of Wasatch and the
Jensens necessarily should be reversed.
7

Wasatch and the Jensens devote nearly all of their response brief to justifying the trial
court's entry of summary judgment in their favor. But they make no reference to facts in the
record that would support their position, and they make at best scant reference to the
language of the Combined Agreement itself. Instead, their response brief merely repeats
their mantra of the truism that a corporation must act through its officers and directors.
(Aplee. Br. at 8.)
Because their argument is made without reference to any contract language, extrinsic
evidence, relevant case, or even common sense and experience, Wasatch and the Jensens
really ask the court to supply a factual inference,-derived from the truism that corporations
must act through their officers and directors,-that an individual who has signed a contract
both in his or her corporate and individual capacities, may never be intended to receive any
of the benefits of the contract. They essentially argue from the truism that the parties must
have intended to impose personal obligations on Orlob, but allow him no rights to payments.
In their response brief, Wasatch and the Jensens seem to admit that Orlob was a party
to the Combined Agreement in his individual capacity. {See, e.g., Aplee. Br. at 8 (the
Combined Agreement "bind[s] Orlob individually to perform the terms of the contract on
behalf of PCG, ..."), at 11 ("the covenant not to compete in the instant case plainly and by
its express terms bound both the Plaintiff and PCG.") This construction of the Combined
Agreement was apparently adopted by the trial court in its conclusions of law. (R. 783, "by
its terms, the Combined Agreement seeks to bind the Plaintiff Orlob as the individual
responsible for carrying out the obligations set forth therein on behalf of PCG.") In the trial
court, and again in their response brief, Wasatch and the Jensens have offered no reported
case to support their novel proposition that an individual can have enforceable obligations
under a contract, yet have no enforceable rights thereunder. Indeed, Wasatch and the Jensens
8

have taken this proposition to its extreme level, and contend that, aside from the initial
transfer ofPCG's assets (equipment and physician contracts), PCG had no further obligations
under the Combined Agreement. Rather, Orlob, individually, was obligated to perform the
contract over the ten year term of the covenant not to compete. (Aplee. Br. at 8, "It is
abundantly clear from the contract itself that Plaintiff Orlob was included as a separate
signatory so that some person would be required to undertake the obligations of the corporate
entity.")
Paragraph 6 of the Combined Agreement unambiguously provided that, in exchange
for the payment of commissions over a term of nearly six years, "Orlob further agrees and
warrants he will not compete directly or indirectly in Utah against or adverse to Jensens in
the billing and collection business for a period often years commencing August 1, 1988."
2

(R. 050.) (Emphasis added.) The issue is whether Orlob, individually, had the right to

receive payments under the Combined Agreement in exchange for his obviously personal
covenant not to compete. Wasatch and the Jensens allege they were entitled, under the
Combined Agreement, to enforce the covenant not to compete against Orlob, individually,
but he had no rights to receive payments, individually, for not operating a billing and
collection business in Utah for a period often years.
As Orlob explained in his opening brief, the fundamental flaw in Wasatch and the
Jensens' argument is the absence of any consideration of good will. (See Aplt. Br. at 17-21.)
Wasatch and the Jensens became the owners of PCG's physician contracts after the sale, but
they could not retain the value of those contracts without a covenant not to compete on the
2

This was a provision Wasatch and the Jensens wanted because of the personal
goodwill Orlob had created in his dealings with the doctors. Without the covenant from
Orlob, he could open another billing practice and exploit his personal goodwill. PCG was
left with no assets and no business after the sale. It was effectively dead and later
dissolved.
9

part of Orlob, individually. The physician contracts concerned the provision of billing and
collection services, which is a fungible service, and could have been provided by a number
of different service providers. This condition is evidenced by the fact that the contracts could
be terminated with 90 days' (and in some cases 30 days') notice. (R. 469-99.) As such, the
only property interest PCG had in the contracts, and the only property Wasatch and the
Jensens purchased, was the good will that PCG had established with the physicians.
Orlob was exclusively responsible for creating the contractual relationships between
PCG and the physicians, and, more importantly, for retaining the physicians as clients. In
other words, the good will of the physician contracts inhered in the person of Orlob.
Knowing this, Wasatch and the Jensens required Orlob to sign the Combined Agreement in
his individual capacity in order to bind him to paragraph 6, the covenant not to compete.
Although Wasatch and the Jensens are correct in noting that a corporation can only
act through its agents (Aplee. Br. at 8.), that general principle is unavailing to them in light
of the transferability of good will. The leading case in Utah on the concept of good will is
Allen v. Rose Park Pharmacy, 237 P.2d 823 (Utah 1951). There the Utah Supreme Court
recognized a protectible interest on the part of an employer in the good will of the business.
Id. At 827. The salient fact in that case was the special relationship that existed between the
employee-pharmacist-manager and the employer's customers. This special relationship
created good will, which was a valuable property of the business. Id. at 616-17. But "when
the individual responsible for creating the good will and the business to which it attaches,
become separated, it is necessary to preserve that good will to the business by a covenant in
an area where his personal reputation will detach the old customers from the old business."
M a t 617.
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All of PCG's assets were transferred to Wasatch and the Jensens under the Combined
Agreement dated August 1, 1988. (R. 042; R. 063.) With no assets, PCG ceased doing
business at approximately the same time, and was eventually dissolved as a Utah corporation
in January 1990. (R. 459; R. 781.) Wasatch and the Jensens began servicing the physician
contracts when the Combined Agreement became effective. (R. 427-28.) The reasonable
inference to which Orlob is entitled and which the payments to him individually support, is
that PCG could not compete, because it was defunct, and Orlob was in fact the intended
beneficiary of the covenant not to compete payments.
After August 1, 1988, the business and the individual responsible for creating the
good will became separated. It then became necessary to preserve the good will to the
business by a covenant in the area (Utah) where Orlob's personal reputation (effective
provider of billing and collections services) would detach the old customers (physicians)
from the old business (Wasatch and the Jensens as the successor to PCG).
Even though Orlob, in his opening brief, emphasized the importance of good will,
Wasatch and the Jensens do not mention good will in their response brief. Instead, Wasatch
and the Jensens essentially rely upon the same few inapposite cases they cited to the trial
court in support of their contention that a corporation is only capable of acting through its
officers and directors. (Aplee. Br. at 8.)
However, this general proposition has no bearing on the issue in question because it
does not answer the question of how Orlob could, as Wasatch and the Jensens contend, have
individual obligations under the Combined Agreement but, at the same time, not have
individual rights to receive payments. It does not answer the question of how Orlob, as the
officer and director of PCG, could be individually obligated to perform the contractual
obligations of the corporation after he effectively separated from the corporation when it
11

ceased doing business on the effective date of the Combined Agreement, after he relocated
from Utah to Los Angeles in October 1989, and after PCG was dissolved as a Utah
corporation in January 1990.
Wasatch and the Jensens cite, for the first time, Horman v. Gordon, 740 P.2d 1346
(Utah App. 1987), which they suggest stands for the proposition that "[w]here parties fail to
bind corporate officers as well as the corporation itself, difficulties may arise." (Aplee. Br.
At 9.) But, similar to the other few cases Wasatch and the Jensens cited to the trial court, this
general proposition does not assist them.3 Horman does not show that an officer and director
can be bound, individually, to perform obligations under a contract, without his or her
consent, yet receive no consideration, individually. Nor does it suggest that an individual
signatory to an agreement that was additionally signed in a corporate capacity cannot, as a
matter of law, receive some or all of the fruits of the agreement. Nor does that case explain
or in any way account for all payments having in fact been made to Orlob, individually.
Horman is inapposite, and concerned enforcement of a series of promissory notes in
connection with a series of convoluted transactions.
Wasatch and the Jensens contend that the "difficulty" with Orlob's position "is that
he is unable to identify in any fashion the manner in which his alleged interest in the contract
and PCG's interest in the contract should be allocated." (Aplee. Br. at 9.)
Allocation is a red herring. Orlob individually gave a covenant not to compete for
which he and he alone was to be paid. All payments that were in fact made for the covenant
not to compete were in fact made to Orlob, individually, by Wasatch and the Jensens. PCG
effectively ceased doing business from the moment the Combined Agreement was signed,
3

Wasatch and the Jensens provide no page reference within the Horman
decision indicating that that court ever stated such a general proposition. Nor does the
decision state as much.
12

and somewhat later was actually dissolved for failure to file an annual report, and could not
compete. Orlob is entitled to all the non-competition benefit.
Even if Wasatch and the Jensens had proffered a fact into the record contrary to
Orlob's entitlement to all such funds, which they did not, Orlob would still be entitled to a
reasonable inference that if one-half the non-compete obligation was PCG's and one-half his
individually, that he should receive at least half. The fact of the payments themselves being
made entirely to Orlob, individually, establishes the true situation.
Moreover, that question goes to damages, which are not an issue in this appeal. The
issue in this appeal concerns Orlob's rights, individually, to receive payments under the
Combined Agreement, and Wasatch and the Jensens' breach of their obligations to make
those payments. The undisputed evidence shows that Wasatch and the Jensens made no
further payments to Orlob after the IRS auction. (R. 432.) Accordingly, the fact finder
should determine Orlob's damages arising from the breach.
In any event, Wasatch and the Jensens have, through their undisputed conduct,
already pointed to the value of Orlob's rights to payments. They made full commission
payments to Orlob individually from the commencement of the commission period on
October 1, 1988, and continued to make full commission payments to Orlob after PCG was
dissolved as a Utah corporation in January 1990. (R. 732-44.) Wasatch and the Jensens
obviously understood that, after they initially paid $15,000 to PCG for its equipment, all
further payments should be allocated to Orlob, individually. This approach is consistent with
Wasatch and the Jensens' own understanding that, after the equipment and physician
contracts were transferred, all further obligations were to be performed by Orlob in his
individual capacity. (Aplee. Br. at 8.)
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Wasatch and the Jensens contend they would, under Orlob's construction of the
Combined Agreement, be obligated to make payments twice for the same covenant not to
compete. (Aplee. Br. at 10.) This argument attempts to distort the actual facts and again
misapprehends the doctrine of good will. Wasatch and the Jensens paid Orlob for the
covenant not to compete because, when he separated from PCG on the effective date of the
Combined Agreement, he carried with him the potential to deprive Wasatch and the Jensens
of the fruits of their contract to purchase the physician contracts. Orlob had created the good
will, and he could therefore detach the old customers from the old business. There was no
real need for PCG not to compete, because it could not anyway where it no longer had assets.
Only Orlob, individually, was in a position to compete.
In any event, the argument is specious. The Combined Agreement calls for certain
sums to be paid for the non-compete obligation and both PCG and Orlob signed the
Combined Agreement. Wasatch and the Jensens would have a defense of payment if they
had in fact paid, and any remaining dispute would have to be between PCG and Orlob. Since
PCG was never intended to survive the Combined Agreement, however, even that scenario
would have been impossible.
Further, Wasatch and the Jensens' obligations to make separate payments to PCG and
Orlob, individually, under the Combined Agreement arise from the different obligations of
the latter parties. PCG agreed to transfer all its assets to Wasatch and the Jensens. Orlob,
individually, agreed to cooperate in the transfer of the physician contracts, and not to
compete for the right to provide billing and collection services in Utah for a period of ten
years. Thus, Wasatch and the Jensens were not obligated to make payments twice. Instead,
they were obligated to pay PCG for one type of performance and Orlob for another type.
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As the movant for summary judgment, Wasatch and the Jensens "must establish a
right to judgment based on the applicable law as applied to an undisputed material issue of
fact." Ron Shepherd Insur., Inc. v. Shields, 882 P.2d 650, 654 (Utah 1994). They have
utterly failed to do so and, in any event, disputed facts would prohibit summary judgment in
favor of Wasatch and the Jensens, as shown below.
B.

Genuine Issues of Material Fact Preclude Summary Judgment in Favor
of Wasatch and the Jensens.
1.

The trial court's "Findings of Fact'' have no preclusive effect in this
appeal from an order of summary judgment.

Wasatch and the Jensens' failure to provide references to the record is in keeping with
their apparent assumption that the trial court's "Findings of Fact" have some preclusive or
persuasive effect on this appeal. (Aplee. Br. at 12, "The District Court's factual findings will
not be disturbed unless it can be shown that those findings are clearly erroneous.")
In reviewing the entry of summary judgment in favor of Wasatch and the Jensens, the
trial court's ruling is reviewed for correctness, and no deference is accorded the trial court's
findings of fact or conclusions of law. Pierce v. Pierce, 2000 UT 7,118,994 P.2d 193,198.
Thus, in this appeal, Orlob is not required to controvert the trial court's "Findings of Fact,"
as Wasatch and the Jensens appear to suggest. Rather, he is merely required to point to any
record evidence establishing the existence of a genuine issue of material fact. See Utah R.
Civ. P. 56(c).
2.

The extrinsic evidence raises a genuine issue of material fact.

As to their course of conduct, Wasatch and the Jensens respond they made payments
under the Combined Agreement to Orlob in his individual capacity because he was "the sole
owner of PCG." (Aplee. Br. at 12.) As with so many of the arguments of Wasatch and the
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Jensens, it is difficult to discern a relevant point here, but apparently they make no distinction
between PCG and Orlob.
The general rule, however, "is that a corporation is an entity separate and distinct from
its officers, shareholders and directors

" Redeker v. Salisbury, 952 P.2d 577, 582 (Utah

App. 1998). Consequently, any payment made payable to "David L. Orlob" was not payment
to PCG. For that to occur, Wasatch and the Jensens would have had to make the checks
payable to PCG. They did not, and in fact every check made a part of the record (R. 732-44)
is made payable to "David L. Orlob."
Thus, Wasatch and the Jensens provide no real response to Orlob's showing that their
course of conduct reveals their clear understanding that they were obligated under the
Combined Agreement to make payments to Orlob, individually. Wasatch and the Jensens'
course of conduct is the best indication of their meaning and intent with respect to the
Combined Agreement. See EIEy 638 P.2d at 1195. Orlob is entitled to all reasonable
inferences that flow in his favor from those payments being made to him, personally.
Accordingly, the payments from Wasatch and the Jensens to Orlob, personally, for more than
two years after the effective date of the Combined Agreement, and until the IRS auction in
December 1990, raise a genuine issue of material fact that preclude summary judgment. The
trial court erred when it failed to recognize the existence of disputed facts, and entered
summary judgment in favor of Wasatch and the Jensens.
III.

The Trial Court's Ruling Denying Wasatch and the Jensens5 Request for
Attorney's Fees Should Be Affirmed.
Wasatch and the Jensens cross-appeal the trial court's denial of their motion for

attorney's fees under the Combined Agreement. In the event this Court agrees with Orlob,
and the trial court's ruling of summary judgment in favor of Wasatch and the Jensens is
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reversed, the cross-appeal on the denial of an award of attorney's fees is not ripe. In that
case, Wasatch and the Jensens would not be prevailing parties.
In Utah, "attorney fees are awardable only if authorized by statute or by contract."
Turtle Management, Inc. v. Haggis Management, Inc., 645 P.2d 667, 671 (Utah 1982); see
UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 78-27-56.5 (1986). "Those requesting an attorney fees award under a

contract must show that the contract's provisions contemplate that award." Maynard v.
Wharton, 912 P.2d 446, 451 (Utah App.) cert, denied, 919 P.2d 1208 (Utah 1996). The
"attorney fees authorized by contract are awardable only in accordance with the explicit
terms of the contract and only to the extent permitted by the contract." Id. The burden is on
the party requesting an attorney fees award under a contract to "show that the contract's
provisions contemplate that award." Id.
Wasatch and the Jensens moved the trial court for an award of attorney's fees under
paragraph 21 of the Combined Agreement. Paragraph 21 provides that the "Parties further
acknowledge that in the event of a default the non-defaulting party shall be entitled to all
costs, including reasonable attorney fees, to enforce the terms and conditions of this
Agreement against the defaulting party." Thus, paragraph 21 contemplates an award subject
to a two-part showing: (1) the respondent is a party; and (2) a default has been proven and
enforcement sought.
By its plain terms, paragraph 21 allows a party to the Combined Agreement to recover
attorney's fees as costs only "in the event of a default." In its "Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law," however, the trial court never found that Orlob, individually, was a
"defaulting party" under the Combined Agreement, and never found that Wasatch and the
Jensens were a "non-defaulting party" in relation to Orlob. As such, there is no basis for an
award of attorney's fees as costs under paragraph 21.
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The case of Carr v. Enoch Smith Co., 781 P.2d 1292 (Utah App. 1989), is directly on
point. There, the Utah Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's award of fees because the
defendant "took an entirely defensive posture." Id., at 1296. Since the agreement only
allowed fees to a party "enforcing this agreement," no fees were awardable to the prevailing
defendant. See id. Here, as in Carr, we are not dealing with a prevailing parties provision,
but a proof of default and enforcement provision.
The trial court concluded, and Wasatch and the Jensens have repeated on appeal, that
Orlob has no enforceable interest in the Combined Agreement separate from PCG. {See
Conclusions of Law, R. 778, 782-84.)

In essence, the trial court ruled that Orlob,

individually, was not a party to the Combined Agreement.
Thus, because the Court has effectively ruled that Orlob, individually, was not a party
to the Combined Agreement, Wasatch and the Jensens are not entitled to an award of
attorney's fees under paragraph 21 of the Combined Agreement. Stated differently, Orlob
cannot be liable for attorney's fees under a contractual provision that is not enforceable by
or against him, individually. See Wardley Corp. v. Welsh, 962 P.2d 86, 91-92 (Utah App.
1998) (affirming trial court's denial of award of attorneys' fees to a third party beneficiary
because the terms "party" and "parties" in the attorney fees provision was, in the context of
the entire contract, limited to the signatories to the contract).
CONCLUSION
David L. Orlob respectfully requests the following relief:
1.

That the trial court's order denying Orlob's motion for partial summary

judgment on Orlob's claims be reversed, and this action be remanded to the trial court with
instructions to enter partial summary judgment in favor of Orlob on his claims that he has an
enforceable interest in the Combined Agreement that survived the IRS auction of PCG's
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interest therein, if any, and Wasatch and the Jensens breached their obligations to make
payments to Orlob under the Combined Agreement in exchange for Orlob's covenant not to
compete;
2.

Concomitantly or alternatively, that the trial court' s order granting Wasatch and

the Jensens' motion for summary judgment on Orlob's claims be reversed because Wasatch
and the Jensens are not entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law, including without
limitation for the reason that genuine issues of material fact exist; and
3.

That the trial court's order refusing to award attorney's fees to Wasatch and

the Jensens be affirmed.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 10th day of July, 2001.
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